Duquesne Law Review
Volume 40

Number 4

Article 7

2002

Massachusetts Regulations on Cigarette Advertising Are
Preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
and Massachusetts Regulations on Cigar and Smokeless
Tobacco Advertising Fail the Central Hudson Test for Commercial
Speech and Violate the First Amendment: Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly
Angela M. Sheffler

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Angela M. Sheffler, Massachusetts Regulations on Cigarette Advertising Are Preempted by the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and Massachusetts Regulations on Cigar and Smokeless Tobacco
Advertising Fail the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech and Violate the First Amendment:
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 40 Duq. L. Rev. 717 (2002).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol40/iss4/7

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Massachusetts Regulations on Cigarette Advertising
are Preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act and Massachusetts Regulations
on Cigar and Smokeless Tobacco Advertising Fail
the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech
and Violate the First Amendment:
Lorllard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

SUPREMACY CLAUSE -

FIRST AMENDMENT -

The United
States Supreme Court held that Massachusetts regulations
regarding point-of-sale and outside cigarette advertising were
preempted by the FCLAA. The majority also held that
Massachusetts regulations regarding point-of-sale and outside cigar
and smokeless tobacco advertising failed the Central Hudson
four-part test for commercial speech because the regulations were
too broad to be constitutional. However, the Court held that the
Massachusetts regulations regarding sale of tobacco products
passed the Central Hudson test because of the substantial interest
of Massachusetts that was promoted and the regulations were
narrow enough to be constitutional.
COMMERCIAL

SPEECH -

THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST -

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001)
Following the agreement between Massachusetts, along with
forty other states, and cigarette manufacturers in 1998, the
Massachusetts Attorney General, Scott Harshberger, stated that he
wanted to enact more regulations to protect consumers, especially
children, from tobacco advertising and sales.' These regulations
were promulgated in January of 1999 under the Attorney General's
authority to stop "unfair or deceptive practices in trade."2 The goal
of these regulations on cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars
was to restrict the advertising and the sale of such products to
minors. 3 The Attorney General's regulations went beyond what was
1. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (2001). The agreement between
Massachusetts and the cigarette manufacturers can be obtained at: http://www.naag.org.
2. MAsS. GEN. LAws ch. 93A, § 2 (1997). These laws vest the Attorney General with the
authority to make regulations. Id.
3. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 21.01-21.07, 27.01-27.09 (2000). These regulations
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contained in the 1998 agreement by placing restrictions on outside
advertisements, transactions between seller and buyer, mailings,
4
samples, promotions, and wrappers for cigars.
Prior to the regulations becoming effective, a group of tobacco
product manufacturers and retailers brought an action against the
Attorney General of Massachusetts, Thomas Reilly, in the United
States District Court for the district of Massachusetts.' The
manufacturers claimed that the state tobacco regulations were
unconstitutional and were preempted by federal tobacco
regulations. 6 The district court first heard the Supremacy Clause
claim. 7 The tobacco companies urged in their claim that the
provide, in pertinent part, that for cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, cigars, and little cigars:
(2) . . . it shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any person who sells or
distributes cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products [and cigars and little cigars]
through a retail outlet located within Massachusetts to engage in any of the following
. . . practices . . . (c) Using self-service displays of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco
products; [and cigars and little cigars]; (d) Failing to place cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products [and cigars and little cigars] out of the reach of all consumers, and
in a location accessible only to outlet personnel ... (5) ... It shall be an unfair or
deceptive act or practice for any manufacturer, distributor, or retailer to engage in any
of the following practices: (a) outdoor advertising, including advertising in enclosed
stadiums and advertising within a retail establishment that is directed toward or
visible from the outside of the establishment, in any location that is within a 1,000
foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public park, elementary
school, or secondary school; (b) Point-of-sale advertising of cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco products [and cigars and little cigars] any portion of which is placed lower
than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment which is located within a one
thousand foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public park,
elementary school, or secondary school, and which is not an adult-only retail
establishment. In addition, for cigars and little cigars: (1) . . . it shall be an unfair or
deceptive act or practice for any person who sells or distributes cigars or little cigars
directly to consumers within Massachusetts to engage in any of the following
practices: (a) Sampling of cigars or little cigars or promotional give-aways of cigars or
little cigars.
Id.
4. Lorillard,121 S. Ct. at 2410-11.
5. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 76 F Supp. 2d 124 (D. Mass. 1999). The tobacco
companies involved were four cigarette manufacturers (Lorillard Tobacco Co., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., and Philip Morris Inc.), one maker of
smokeless tobacco products (U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co.), and several cigar producers and
sellers. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2412.
6.
Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2412. The claim that the regulations were unconstitutional
was based on the First Amendment, which provides in pertinent part, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
7. Loriard,121 S. Ct. at 2412. Whether a federal law preempts a state law is governed
by the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Constitution. Id. The Supremacy Clause states
in pertinent part that federal laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, §
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Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("FCLAA") preempts
8
the Massachusetts regulations because of the Supremacy Clause.
The district court held that the Massachusetts regulations were
based on the location of the advertising, which the FCLAA did not
restrict; therefore, the FCLAA did not preempt the Massachusetts
regulations. 9
In a second opinion, the district court heard the First
Amendment claim. 10 The tobacco companies argued that the
regulations should be subject to a strict scrutiny standard to
determine their constitutionality." The district court rejected this
suggestion and instead used the Central Hudson four-part test for
commercial speech. 2 The district court held that the Massachusetts
regulations regarding outside advertisements and selling practices
(i.e., keeping tobacco products behind the counter) did not violate
the First Amendment. 13 The district court also held that the
(i.e., no
regulation regarding point-of-sale advertisements
advertisements lower than five feet in places where tobacco
products are sold) did violate the First Amendment.14 The tobacco
5
companies appealed both district court decisions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed
with the district court that the Massachusetts regulations were not
preempted by the FCLAA. 16 On the First Amendment issues, the
court of appeals applied the same test as the district court and
1, cl. 2.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-34 (2000). These statutes address health warnings on the
packaging and advertising of cigarettes. Id.
9. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2412.
10. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F Supp. 2d 180 (D. Mass. 2000).
11. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2412.
12. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
The four-part test provides in pertinent part:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
13. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2412-13.
14. Id. at 2413.
15. Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F 3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000).
16. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2413. The First Circuit reached this conclusion based on
GreaterNew York Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F. 3d 100 (2d Cir. 1999)
and Federationof Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. Chicago, 189 F 3d 633 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the content of the advertising is what is important, not the location).
Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2413.
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concluded that the outside advertisement regulation, the
point-of-sale regulation, and the selling restrictions did not violate
the First Amendment.' 7 The court of appeals did not issue any
order due to the petition by the tobacco companies to the Supreme
Court of the United States. is The, cigarette companies and the
smokeless tobacco company sought review of the court of appeals'
findings regarding the outside and point-of-sale regulations, citing
First Amendment and Supremacy Clause concerns, and regarding
the selling restrictions, citing First Amendment reasons only.' 9 The
cigar companies questioned the court of appeals' findings on the
First Amendment issues with regard to all three regulations.20
The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to a conflict in the
circuit courts regarding the Supremacy Clause issue, and to address
the First Amendment rights of the tobacco companies. 2' The
majority held that the FCLAA preempts the Massachusetts
regulations, which restrict outside and point-of-sale advertising of
cigarettes, and therefore it was unnecessary for the Court to reach
the First Amendment issues for these regulations. 22 Justice
O'Connor, writing on behalf of the majority, held that the outside
and point-of-sale advertising regulations on cigars and smokeless
tobacco products were unconstitutional23 Finally, the Court held
that the selling restrictions for all of the tobacco products were
24
constitutional.
Prior to addressing any First Amendment issues, the majority
discussed the Supremacy Clause issue regarding the outside and
point-of-sale regulations on cigarettes. 25 The Court first discussed
the specific area that the FCLAA regulated 26 to determine if the
17. Consol. Cigar, 218 F 3d 30.
18. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2413.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2413-14.
21. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 531 U.S. 1068 (2001). The petition for certiorari by
the smokeless tobacco company and the cigarette manufacturers and the petition for
certiorari by the cigar companies were granted. Id.
22. Loriflard, 121 S. Ct. at 2419.
23. Id. at 2428.
24. Id. at 2430.
25. Id. at 2414.
26. 26. 15 U.S.C. §1334 (2000). This statute provides:
(a) Additional statements No statements related to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by §1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) State regulations No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter.
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FCIAA trumped the Massachusetts regulations regarding outside
and point-of-sale advertising of cigarettes.27 The majority
interpreted the language in the FCLAA through an examination of
the prior FCLAA provision and the conditions under which the
present version came into effect. 28 The Court determined that the

original purpose of the FCLAA, as it was enacted in 1965, was to
warn the public about the health risks posed by cigarettes and to
assure uniformity across the nation in cigarette labeling and
advertising. 29 In addition, the majority reported that the FCLAA was
to have been revamped in 1969, which plan led to committee
hearings in the House and Senate that year.30 The Court stated that

the House passed a bill to make the warning stronger and keep the
preemption provisions in the FCLAA 31 as it was and the Senate
changed the bill to include a ban of cigarette advertising on
television and radio.32 The majority then examined Congress' 1984
amendment to the FCLAA,3 which was designed to further educate
the public about the health risks associated with smoking.34
The Court analyzed this history of the FCLAA and the language
of the statute to determine whether the federal law trumped the
Massachusetts regulations. 35 The majority interpreted the phrase
"based on smoking and health" from the FCLAA to mean that
Congress intended to prevent states from creating regulations on
cigarette advertising to the extent that the regulations were
designed with the purpose of addressing any smoking and health
concern. 36 The Court reasoned that the Massachusetts cigarette
regulations governing outside and point-of-sale advertising have
smoking and health as a primary concern because Massachusetts'
intention was to prevent cigarette advertising directed at youth as a
37
means of protecting children's health.
The Court then addressed Justice Stevens' contention that the
Massachusetts regulations were designed to restrict location and
Id.
27. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2415.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2416.
31. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87 (1969).
32. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2416. This act ushered in the present version of the FCLAA
(available at supra note 26). Id.
33. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).
34. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2416.
35. Id. at 2417.
36. Id. at 2418.
37. Id.
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not content.3 8 The majority rejected Justice Stevens' argument by
stating that the Massachusetts regulations were not mere zoning
regulations and were motivated by a regard for public health and
the risks of smoking.39 The Court also found that if Justice Stevens'
contention were correct, then the FCLAA in itself would serve no
purpose because State and local government could direct
regulations to stop all advertisement of cigarettes. 40 The majority
then held that the FCLAA preempts the outside and point-of-sale
regulations for cigarettes. 41 Next, the Court detailed what powers
the States maintain to regulate cigarette advertising, such as zoning
regulations and the prevention of cigarette sales to minors.42
Finally, the majority refused to decide if the FCLAA preempts the
outside and point-of-sale regulations for smokeless tobacco because
the issue was never addressed in any of the lower courts."
Following the discussion of the FCLAA, the Court turned to the
First Amendment issue regarding the outside and point-of-sale
regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars and the First
Amendment issue regarding the selling restrictions on all of the
tobacco products." The majority discussed the four elements of the
Central Hudson test for commercial speech. 45 The Court applied
the Central Hudson test to the outside regulations of smokeless
tobacco and cigar advertising.46 The Court found that the outside
regulations did meet the first three parts of the Central Hudson
test but could not meet the fourth.47 The Court applied the fourth
part and found the outside regulations to be too broad to be
constitutional. 48 The majority reasoned that the outside regulations
banning cigars or smokeless tobacco advertisements within 1,000
yards of a school or playground covered too large a geographic
area and would be an almost complete ban on this type of
advertising to adult consumers who are lawfully allowed to
38. Id. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id.
at 2440-48 (Stevens, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Lori /ard, 121 S. Ct. at 2419.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2420.
43. Id.
44. LorWard, 121 S.Ct. at 2421.
45. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
46. Lori/ard, 121 S.Ct. at 2422.
47. Id. at 2425.
48. Id.
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purchase tobacco products. 49 The Court held the outside
regulations on cigars and smokeless tobacco advertising to be
unconstitutional.6°
The majority then addressed the constitutionality of the
point-of-sale regulations on cigar and smokeless tobacco
advertisements. 51 The Court determined that the regulations
satisfied the first two parts of the Central Hudson test but failed
the third and fourth elements. 52 The majority applied the third part
and found that since the regulation only required that advertising of
smokeless tobacco and cigars be five feet or higher from the floor,
the regulation did not promote the governmental interest in
preventing minors from seeing the advertisements.3 The Court
reasoned that there are some minors who are taller than five feet
and there is nothing to prevent a child who is less than five feet
tall from looking up.M
The majority then criticized Justice Stevens' contention that the
point-of-sale regulations were aimed at conduct and not
communication so that the First Amendment does not apply.5 The
Court found that in order for the regulation to be one of conduct,
and not of communication under the O'Brien test, the regulation
must be totally "unrelated to expression."56 The majority
determined that the point-of-sale regulation was a direct regulation
of communication and not of conduct." The Court held that the
point-of-sale regulations on smokeless tobacco and cigar
advertisements were unconstitutional.8
Finally, the majority addressed the contention that the
regulations on cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar sales by
Massachusetts were unconstitutional. 59 The Court again applied the
49. Id. at 2426. Here, the Court cited Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844, 875 (1997), which held that "the governmental interest in protecting children from
harmful materials [here indecent speech on the internet] . . . does not justify an
unnecessarily broad suspension of speech addressed to adults." Id.
50. Id. at 2427.
51. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2427.
52. Id. at 2428.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Justice Stevens relied on United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), as his
test of conduct. Id. at 244048 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2428. The Court stated, "to qualify as a regulation of
communicative action governed by the scrutiny outlined in O'Brien, the State's regulation
must be unrelated to expression." Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59.

Id.
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Central Hudson test to the sales regulations that required all
tobacco products to only be accessible by salespersons and found
that the regulations met all four parts of the test.6° The majority
found that keeping tobacco products out of the hands of minors
was a "substantial interest" of the State, and the sales regulations
61
were "an appropriately narrow means of advancing that interest."
The Court held that the sales regulations on all tobacco products
were constitutional. 62
Justice O'Connor concluded the majority opinion by stating that
the States are free to help stop underage use of tobacco products
as long as their actions do not violate the First Amendment and are
not preempted by federal law.6 The majority affirmed in part and
reversed in part the decision of the United States Court of Appeals,
and remanded the case.64
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the
judgment and concurred with all but Part III-B-1 of the majority
opinion. 65 Justice Kennedy found the majority's discussion of the
third part of the Central Hudson test to be unnecessary. 66 Justice
Kennedy expressed his inability to agree with the inclusion of the
third part of the Central Hudson test because he found that part to
be problematic in that it may cause speech that is constitutional to
be found unconstitutional.6 7 Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia,
however, concurred in the result because the regulations that were
found to be unconstitutional by the majority were
unconstitutionally overbroad.6
Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment and with all of
the majority opinion except for III-B-1.6 9 His only contention with
the majority opinion was that the majority applied too lax a
standard in order to determine if the Massachusetts regulations
60. Id. at 2429.
61. LoriUard, 121 S. Ct. at 2430.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2430 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The third part of the Central
Hudson test concerns "whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interests
asserted." Id. at 2421 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 2430 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, Justice Kennedy was referring to the outside
advertising and point-of-sale advertising regulations on cigar and smokeless tobacco
advertisements. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 2431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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violated the First Amendment.7" Justice Thomas first addressed the
position that the Massachusetts regulations were aimed at
restricting location, and not content, and should be upheld on that
basis. 71 He countered that point by stating that Massachusetts
created its regulations because of its objection to what was
contained in the advertising, and not because of the location of the
advertisements. 72
Justice Thomas then gave a brief history of the First Amendment
protection of commercial speech.7 3 He expounded his opinion that
commercial speech should be given the same level of protection
that noncommercial speech receives, and a strict scrutiny test
should be used to determine if restrictions on commercial speech
are constitutional, as opposed to the Central Hudson test as it was
applied in the majority opinion.7 4 Justice Thomas furthered his
position by explaining the reason why commercial speech has
traditionally
received
less
constitutional
protection
than
noncommercial speech. 75 He offered that this lower level of
protection has applied to commercial speech in the past because
commercial speech can be projected to a lot of people at one time
and commercial speech can contain deceptive advertising. 76 Justice
Thomas countered this traditional standard 'by explaining that
regulating commercial speech due to content, as the Massachusetts
regulations attempted to do, is not similar to the reasons given for
affording commercial speech less protection than noncommercial
77
speech.
Justice Thomas went on to address two points that were made
by the respondents. 78 He stated that the respondents argued that
the Massachusetts regulations were targeted to prevent deceptive
advertising and illegal sales of tobacco products to minors. 79 Justice
Thomas explained that the regulations were designed to prevent
deceptive as well as accurate advertisements, which demonstrates
70. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 2431-32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 2432 (Thomas, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 2432-33 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas' position was first
expressed in his concurring opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
518 (1996). Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 2433 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76. Lorilard, 121 S. Ct. at 2433 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2434 (Thomas, J., concurring).
79. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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that the regulations were not designed to target deceptive
advertising.80 He then analyzed the respondents' second point by
applying the Brandenburg test.8 1 Justice Thomas opined that the
Massachusetts regulations fail this test because they cover all
advertising, not just advertising that targets minors.8 2 He did not
see how a state could be constitutionally permitted to prevent all
advertising just because what the advertising promotes is illegal for
some members of the advertising audience to purchase. s3 Justice
Thomas concluded that the respondents' two points didn't justify
an application of anything less than a strict scrutiny standard to the
regulations.r
Justice Thomas next applied the strict scrutiny standard to the
facts of the present case.85 He stated that the "compelling
government interest" was to prevent the use of tobacco products
by minors.8 6 Justice Thomas, like Justice O'Connor, stressed that
the point-of-sale advertising regulations prohibiting tobacco
advertising below five feet did nothing to promote the interest of
preventing minors from seeing tobacco advertising, since minors
can be over five feet tall and can look up.8 7 He then criticized the
outside cigar and smokeless tobacco regulations due to the very
limited number of this type of advertisement and the fact that there
is no proof that minors are in any way the audience that outside
88
advertising is directed to by the tobacco companies.
Justice Thomas further explained that even if a "compelling
interest" was promoted by the regulations, the regulations would
not meet the strict scrutiny test due to their overbreadth.89 He
illustrated the overbreadth of the regulations as follows: (1) the
80. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
81. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Brandenburg test provides in
pertinent part, "a state may not forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id.
82. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2435 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 2436 (Thomas, J., concurring).
85. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). The strict scrutiny test was explained in United States
v. Playboy Entertainment as "under strict scrutiny, the advertising ban may be saved only if
it is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest." 529 U.S. at 813 (2000).
And also in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, "if that interest [the government
interest] could be served by an alternative that is less restrictive of speech, then the State
must use that alternative instead." 521 U.S. at 874 (1997).
86. Loritard, 121 S. Ct. at 2436 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2437 (Thomas, J., concurring).
89. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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regulations were geographically too broad because they banned
tobacco product advertising over a large area due to the number of
playgrounds and schools; and (2) the regulations defined the word
"advertisement" in such a way that just about anything mentioning
a tobacco product in any way would be considered an
advertisement 0 Justice
Thomas
next pointed out that
Massachusetts did have other ways to promote its goal of
preventing minors from exposure to tobacco advertising that would
be less broad. 9' He proposed that Massachusetts could make
tougher laws on tobacco sales to minors and make more
anti-tobacco product speech available to minors in order to
counteract the advertising by the tobacco companies.92
Justice Thomas finished his opinion by criticizing the
respondents and their amici for wanting to restrict the freedom of
speech of the tobacco companies to such a vast extent.93 He stated
that there are a variety of harmful products, e.g., fast food and
alcohol, which do not have their speech restricted. 94 Justice
Thomas concluded by stating that the States cannot deny the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to anyone. 95
Justice Souter concurred with most of the majority's opinion, but
dissented to part III-B-2 recommending that the case be remanded
to determine if the outside advertising regulation was
96
constitutional.
Justice Stevens concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in
part, and dissented in part in his opinion.97 Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Breyer, and Justice Souter joined Justice Stevens' opinion. 98
Justice Stevens' main disagreement with the majority concerned the
Supremacy Clause issue.9 He stated that the States had two
guaranteed powers: (1) the power to oversee land use; and (2) the
90. Id. at 2437-38 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2438 (Thomas, J., concurring).
92. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 2438-2440 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that obesity is the
second largest contributor to mortality rates due to its link with a variety of diseases. He
also noted that alcohol is the third largest cause of preventable deaths due to disease and
accidents. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 2440 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. Lori//ard, 121 S.Ct. at 2440 (Souter, J., concurring).
97. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated
that the preemption issue was clear but the First Amendment issue was complex. Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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power to promote the well being of minors. 100 Justice Stevens
explained that based on these powers, the Court has historically
interpreted preemption provisions in a narrow sense. 10 1 He then
analyzed the preemption provision of the FCLAA in light of the
regulations created by the FCLAA.' 0 Justice Stevens explained that
the FCLAA preemption provision was only directed at the content
of tobacco advertising and not at the location of tobacco
advertising.'0 3 He concluded this issue by finding that the
Massachusetts regulations were aimed at location, not content, and
were therefore not trumped by federal law.14
Justice Stevens then addressed his differences with the majority's
opinion regarding the First Amendment challenges.'0 5 He
expounded that the outside advertising regulations were not too
restrictive because it was crucial to keep outside tobacco
advertising away from areas with a lot of children, like playgrounds
and schools. 10 6 Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that there
was a concern that the regulations restricted the freedom to
advertise to adults, but he could not conclude from the record
whether the regulations were too restrictive and therefore would
07
have remanded the case for decision on this issue.'
Justice Stevens then addressed the First Amendment issue
regarding the selling restrictions.'0 8 He concurred with the
majority's conclusion that the selling restrictions did not violate the
First Amendment, but disagreed with one aspect of the Court's
analysis. 1°9 Justice Stevens stated that his problem with the
100. Id. at 2441 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2441 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
102. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated
that Congress adopted the FCLAA for two reasons: "(1) to inform the public that smoking
may be hazardous to health and (2) to ensure that commerce and the interstate economy not
be impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health." Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 2444 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 2445 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. LorlUard, 121 S. Ct. at 2446 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
107. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens found
that the majority lacked enough information as to the areas where the advertising would be
restricted compared to where the advertising would be allowed in order to make a valid
determination of this issue. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id. at 2447-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 2448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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majority's opinion was that the selling restrictions were restrictions
of conduct and not of speech, as the majority had determined. 110 He
found that there was nothing constitutionally wrong with restricting
conduct."' Justice Stevens then explained that the same reasoning
applied to the point-of-sale advertising regulations."2 He proposed
that the five-foot restriction contained in these regulations was a
restriction on conduct and merely an extension of the selling
restrictions.13 Justice Stevens concluded by conceding that he
agreed with most of the majority's First Amendment analysis, but
due to his rejection of the majority's preemption analysis he could
4
only concur in the judgment in part."
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the past, has taken
the position that the First Amendment affords no protection to
commercial speech. 115 The Court first addressed the application of
the First Amendment to commercial speech in Valentine v.
Chrestensen."6 Valentine involved a citizen of Florida who wished
to advertise tours of his submarine with a handbill on the streets of
New York City."' New York City had a statute that prohibited this
type of speech. 18 Chrestensen attempted to distribute his handbills
but the police restrained him. 11 9 Chrestensen filed suit against the
police commissioner for an injunction. 2 0 The district court granted
110. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated
that "however difficult that line may be to draw, it seems clear to me that laws requiring that
stores. maintain items behind counters and prohibiting self-service displays fall squarely on
the conduct side of the line." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Lorilard, 121 S. Ct. at 2448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
112. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). This case discussed the history
of the application of the First Amendment to commercial speech. Id.
116. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
117. Id. at 52-53. F. J. Chrestensen was the citizen of Florida. Id.
118. N.Y. CITY SANITARY §318 (1942). This section provides in pertinent part:
No person shall throw, cast or distribute or cause or permit to be thrown, cast or
distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard or other advertising matter
whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place, or in a front yard or courtyard, or
on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any building, or in a letterbox therein;
provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise
regulate the delivery of any such matter by the United States postal service, or
prohibit the distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or
by annual subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the lawful distribution
of anything other than commercial and business advertising matter.
Id.
119. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53.
120. Id. at 59. Chrestensen asserted that the statute of New York City violated the
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the injunction and the court of appeals affirmed. 2 ' The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari and disagreed with
the district court and the court of appeals. 122 The Court held that
the New York City statute did not restrict Chrestensen's freedom of
speech because "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising."123
The Court reexamined the application of the First Amendment to
24
commercial speech in Breard v. City of Alexandria, Louisiana.
In this case, Jack H. Breard was selling magazines door-to-door in
the City of Alexandria, Louisiana. 125 The City of Alexandria had an
ordinance against this type of speech. 26 Breard was arrested and
was found guilty and given a choice of paying a twenty-five-dollar
fine or spending thirty days in jail. 27 The Supreme Court of
Louisiana affirmed Breard's conviction and the Supreme Court of
28
the United States granted certiorari.
The Court addressed the First Amendment issue by phrasing it as
a question of whether the selling of magazines door-to-door was
protected by the First Amendment. 129 The majority held that this
type of commercial speech was not protected because "freedom of
speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute
where, when and how one chooses." 30 The Court concluded that
3
the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment.' '
Twenty-two years later, The Court revisited this issue in
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
125. Id. at 624.
126. Id. Section 1 of the City of Alexandria ordinance stated in pertinent part:
Be it ordained by the council of the City of Alexandria, Louisiana, in legal session
convened that the practice of going in and upon private residences in the City of
Alexandria, Louisiana, by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or
transient vendors of merchandise not having been requested or invited so to do by the
owner or owners, occupant or occupants of said private residences for the purpose of
soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise and/or disposing of
and/or peddling or hawking the same is declared to be a nuisance and punishable as
such nuisance as a misdemeanor.
Id. at 624-25.
127. Id. at 625. At Breard's trial there was a motion to quash the conviction because
the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, and the Commerce
Clause. Id. The trial court overruled this motion. Id.
128. Id.
129. Breard, 341 U.S. at 641.
130. Id. at 642.
131. Id. at 645.
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Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations.132 In this case, the Pittsburgh Press was running
1
classified advertisements that separated jobs based on gender. '
The National Organization for Women, Inc. notified the Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations ("Commission") that the
Pittsburgh Press had violated the Commission's ordinance." The
Commission ordered the Pittsburgh Press, over its objection that
the ordinance violated the First Amendment, to stop printing the
advertisements because they violated the ordinance. 135 The
commonwealth court found that the Pittsburgh Press could
continue to print advertisements segregated by gender for
organizations that were exempt from the ordinance.136 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania refused to hear the case, and the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari.137 The Court found
that the advertisements were commercial speech and, for that
reason, not afforded the same First Amendment protection as
noncommercial speech. 1 8 However, the Court did imply that
commercial speech, if legal, should be afforded some protection,
but in this case the commercial speech was not afforded protection
because its content was illegal.13 9 The majority concluded that the
ordinance did not violate the First Amendment. 140
Subsequently, the Court approached the First Amendment issue
in Bigelow v. Virginia.4' In this case, Jeffrey C. Bigelow was
132. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
133. Id. at 379.
134. Id. at 378. Section 8 of the Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh
provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful employment practice:
except where based upon a bona fide occupational exemption certificate by the
Commission (a) for any employer to refuse to hire any person or otherwise
discriminate against any person with respect to hiring... because of... sex... (e)
For any employer, employment agency or labor organization to publish or circulate, or
to cause to be published or circulated, any notice or advertisement relating to
employment or membership which indicates any discrimination because of ...
sex
(j) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency or labor
organization, to aid ... in the doing of any act declared to be unlawful employment
practice by this ordinance...
Id.
135. Id. at 380.
136. Id. The exempt organizations were employers of fewer than five persons,
employers outside the City of Pittsburgh, religious organizations, fraternal organizations,
charitable organizations, sectarian organizations, or domestic service jobs. Id.
137. PittsburghPress Co., 413 U.S. at 381.
138. Id. at 385.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 391.
141. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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responsible for publishing the Virginia Weekly. 142 He published an
advertisement for an abortion clinic in his newspaper.'" Bigelow
was then charged with violating a Virginia statute by printing the
advertisement'" and was found guilty at the trial level.'1 5 Bigelow
appealed and the circuit court rejected his claim that the statute
was unconstitutional, and fined him $150.146 The Supreme Court of
Virginia then affirmed the judgment of both the trial court and the
circuit court.

47

The Supreme Court of the United States then

granted certiorari.'4" The Court first refuted the conclusion of the
Supreme Court of Virginia that there is no First Amendment
protection afforded to paid commercial speech. 4 9 The majority
quoted from Ginzburg v. United States150 and reported, "the
existence of commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for
narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First
Amendment." 51 The Court then discussed how PittsburghPress Co.
v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations52 demonstrated
the principle that commercial speech is afforded some protection
by the First Amendment.'53 The majority concluded that the Virginia
statute violated Bigelow's First Amendment rights because the
commercial speech was afforded protection by the First
Amendment. 15
142. Id. at 811.
143. Id. at 812.
144. VA CODE ANN. §18.1-63 (Michie 1960). This statute provides in pertinent part, "if
any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any
publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id.
145. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 813.
146. Id. at 814.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 815.
149. Id. at 819.
150. 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966). In this case a publisher attempted to get mailing
privileges from the postmasters of Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania for the purpose
of selling his publications due to "salacious appeal." Id. at 474. The Court held that
"commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal may support
the determination that the material is obscene even though in other contexts the material
would escape such condemnation." Id.
151. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818.
152. 413 U.S. at 376. The Court quoted the portion of this opinion that implied a First
Amendment protection for commercial speech: "Any First Amendment interest which might
be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably
outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the
commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid
limitation on economic activity." Id. at 389.
153. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821.
154. Id. at 829.
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One year later, the Court was again determining what level of
protection the First Amendment affords to commercial speech. 15 In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., the consumers of prescription drugs in Virginia sued
the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy because they believed that a
Virginia statute related to the speech of pharmacists was
unconstitutional.' 5 The district court found the challenged statute
to be invalid. 57 The Supreme Court then noted jurisdiction of the
appeal. 5 The Court discussed prior cases involving the First
Amendment and commercial speech and found that since Breard v.
City of Alexandria, Louisiana, "the Court has never denied
protection on the ground that the speech in issue was commercial
speech."' 9 The majority concluded that the First Amendment
protects commercial speech, but that commercial speech can be
regulated in some aspects.' 6° The Court held that the commercial
speech advertising the prescription drug prices was protected by
the First Amendment because of the need to promote the free
dissemination of commercial speech, and therefore the Virginia
61
statute was unconstitutional.'
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was the Supreme Court's final
determination that the First Amendment protected commercial
speech, but there had yet to be developed a test to determine if
commercial speech regulations were in violation of the First
Amendment.' 62 A test was announced four years later in Central
155. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (Michie 1974). This statute provides in pertinent part:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who (1) is found
guilty of any crime involving grave moral turpitude, or is guilty of fraud or deceit in
obtaining a certificate of registration; or (2) issues, publishes, broadcasts by radio, or
otherwise, or distributes or uses in any way whatsoever advertising matter in which
statements are made about his professional service which have a tendency to deceive
or defraud the public, contrary to the public health and welfare; or (3) publishes,
advertises, or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount,
price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for
drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only by
prescription.
Id.
157. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 750.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 759.
160. Id. at 771. The Court stated that restrictions have been approved that do not
reference the content of the regulated speech, that the restrictions serve a government
interest, and that the restrictions leave open other means of communication. Id.
161. Id.
162. 425 U.S. 748.
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Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York. 516 In this case the Public Service Commission of New
York ("Commission") put a ban on all advertising by electric
164
utilities if such advertising promotes the use of electricity.
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation ("Central Hudson")
claimed that the Commission's ban violated its First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.165 The trial court found that the ban was valid.'"5
Central Hudson appealed and both the intermediate appellate court
and the New York Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's
ruling.' 67 The Supreme Court of the United States then heard the
case. ,68
The Court discussed a brief history of the protection afforded to
commercial speech by the First Amendment. 169 The majority noted
that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech to
the extent that it protects noncommercial speech, but commercial
speech still deserves some protection.' 70 The Court then developed
a four-part test to be applied to regulations of commercial speech
in order to determine if the regulations violated the First
Amendment.1 7' The four-part test provides:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
163. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
164. Id. at 559. The Commission wanted to ban this type of advertisement as a means
of conserving energy. Id.
165. Id. at 560.
166. Id. at 561.
167. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 390 N.E. 2d 749 (1979). The New York
Court of Appeals' opinion stressed that since consumers have no choice of what electric
company to use there was no need for electric utilities to advertise. Id.
168. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y, 444 U.S. 962 (1979).
169. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-64. The Court included several cases in its
discussion: Va. Pharmacy Board v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. BeUotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); PittsburghPress Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376 (1973). Id.
170. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The Court noted that commercial speech has
been permitted to be regulated in the past for two reasons:
First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their
products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and
the lawfulness of the underlying activity . . . In addition, commercial speech, the
offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not
particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.
Id.
171. Id. at 566.
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activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest. 172
The majority concluded that the Commission's order failed the
fourth part of the test173by being too extensive, and thereby violated
the First Amendment.
Following Central Hudson Gas, the four-part test that was
developed in that case has been applied in a number of other cases
with varied results. 174 The test was applied first in Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.1 75 In this
case Puerto Rico legalized some forms of gambling but prohibited76
the advertisement of gambling to the public of Puerto Rico.'
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates ("Associates") sought a
declaratory judgment against the Tourism Company because it
believed that the statute violated the First Amendment.' 77 The
Superior Court of Puerto Rico altered the statute so that gambling
could be advertised as long as the advertisements were directed at
tourists and not at the public of Puerto Rico.'78 The Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico refused to hear the case and the Supreme Court of
the United States noted jurisdiction. 79 The Court applied the
four-part Central Hudson test to the Puerto Rican statute in order
to determine if the statute violated the First Amendment.' s° The
majority found that the statute met all four parts of the Central
Hudson test and was therefore constitutional. 8 1
172. Id.
173. Id. at 571.
174. Posadas de P.R. Associates v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
175. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
176. 15 P.R. LAws ANN.§ 71, 77 (1972). These statutes legalized gambling and prohibited
advertising of gambling. Id.
177. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 334.
178. Id. at 336.
179. Id. at 337.
180. Id. at 340.
181. Id. at 341-345. The Court found that:
(1) The government of Puerto Rico had a strong interest in restricting the
advertisement of gambling to its residents in order to prevent the residents from
experiencing the harms of gambling; (2) the advertising of gambling concerned a
lawful activity that wasn't misleading or fraudulent; (3) the restrictions on the
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Several years later, the Supreme Court again applied the Central
Hudson test in Edenfield v. Fane.'8 2 In this case, Fane was a CPA
in New Jersey.18 Fane decided to move to Florida and continue his
practice there.' 14 The Board of Accountancy in Florida had a rule
against personal solicitation.1 85 Fane, wishing to continue his
practice as he had in New Jersey, brought suit against the Board of
Accountancy, alleging that the rule violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.'8 6 The district court found for Fane and
enjoined the Board of Accountancy from enforcing the rule. 8 7 The
court of appeals agreed with the district court.'1s The Supreme
Court of the United States then granted certiorari.189 The Court
applied the Central Hudson test to the facts of the instant case.'19
The majority found that the interest that the Board of Accountancy
sought to protect was an interest in preventing fraud, overreaching,
and compromised independence.' 91 The Court determined that the
rule did not directly or materially advance the interests of the
Board of Accountancy and therefore, the rule was
92
unconstitutional.
A few months following Edenfield v. Fane, the Court again
employed the Central Hudson test to determine if a restriction on
commercial speech was constitutional in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Company.193 The facts of this case center on the
Edge Broadcasting Company ("the Edge"), which broadcasts
primarily to Virginia residents but also to a number of North
advertising of gambling directly advanced the government's interest because they
prohibited advertising to residents of Puerto Rico; and (4) the restrictions only applied
to advertising directed at residents and not at tourists so the restrictions were not
more extensive then necessary to serve the government's interest.
Id.
182. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
183. Id. at 763.
184. Id.
185. FA ADMrN. CODE ANN. r. 21A-24.002(2)(c) (1992). This rule provides in pertinent
part, "[a CPA] shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation solicit an engagement
to perform public accounting services ... where the engagement should be for a person or
entity not already a client of [the CPA], unless such person or entity has invited such a
communication." Id.
186. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 764.
187. Id. at 765.
188. Edenfield v. Fane, 945 F2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1991).
189. Edenfield v. Fane, 504 U.S. 940 (1992).
190. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767.
191. Id. at 771.
192. Id. at 777.
193. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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Carolina residents. 194 North Carolina has not legalized lotteries, but
Virginia has. 195 Congress enacted statutes in 1934, which were
amended in 1988, that prohibited the advertisement of a lottery
unless the advertisement was of a lottery within states that
permitted lotteries. 196 The Edge sought declaratory judgment and
injunctive protection in the district court because it claimed that
the statutes violated the First Amendment. 197 The district court
found that the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the
Edge. 198 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision
in an unpublished per curiam opinion.'99 The Supreme Court
2°°
questioned what the court of appeals did and granted certiorari.

The Court then applied the Central Hudson test.201 The majority
disagreed with the court of appeals, which had found that the
statutes did not meet the third step of the Central Hudson test
because the regulations did not directly advance the governmental
interest.20 2 The Court examined Board of Trustees of State
194. Id. at 423. The Edge's audience is 92.2% Virginia residents and 7.89 North Carolina
residents. Id.
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-289, 14-291 (1986 & Supp. 1992). These statutes made
lotteries a crime in North Carolina- Id.
196. 18 U.S.C. §1304 (1988 & Supp. 111). This statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio ... for which a license is required by any
law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits
the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, ....
or any list of prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery... shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Id.
18 U.S.C. §1307 (1988 & Supp. I), provides in pertinent part:
Exceptions relating to certain advertisements and other information and to
state-conducted lotteries: (a) the provisions of sections 1301, 1302, 1303, and 1304
shall not apply to - (1) an advertisement, list of prizes, or other information
concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under the authority of State law
which is - (A) contained in a publication published in that State or in a State which
conducts such a lottery; or (B) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a
location in that State or a State which conducts such a lottery; or (2) an
advertisement, list of prizes, or other information concerning a lottery, gift enterprise,
or similar scheme, other than one described in paragraph (1), that is authorized or not
otherwise prohibited by the State in which it is conducted and which is - (A)
conducted by a not-for-profit organization or a governmental organization; or (B)
conducted as a promotional activity by a commercial organization that is clearly
occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that organization.
Id.
197. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 424.
198. Id. at 425.
199. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 956 F2d 263 (4th Cir. 1992).
200. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 506 U.S. 1032 (1992).
201. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 426.
202. Id.
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University of New York v. Fox 0 3 and determined that based on that
case, the third part of the Central Hudson test did not mean that

the regulation and the government interest protected should have a
perfect fit, but that only a reasonable fit was required. 20 4 The
majority concluded that the statutes met all four parts of the
Central Hudson test and therefore the statutes were
constitutional.

20 5

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company, like Edenfield v. Fane,

applied the Central Hudson test to a regulation and found it to be
unconstitutional. 206 In this case, Coors Brewing Company ("Coors")
requested approval of labels and advertisements from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("BATF). 2 7 The BATF refused to
allow the labels and advertisements based on the Federal Alcohol
Administrative Act ("FAAA7). 20 8 Coors sought declaratory and
injunctive relief in the district court, claiming that the regulations
violated the First Amendment. 2° 9 The district court found for
Coors.210 The court of appeals then reversed and remanded the case
to the district court.2" On remand, the district court upheld the
212
advertising regulation but struck down the labeling regulation.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. 2 3 The
Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari. 214 The
Court applied the Central Hudson test.215 The majority focused on
the governmental interest behind the regulation and on whether the
regulation advanced the governmental interest.2 16 The Court found
203. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). This case focused on a university regulation that banned
commercial enterprises from functioning in university dormitories. Id. The Court held that
the regulation was permissible because under Central Hudson the regulation does not have
to be the least restrictive measure that could effectively protect the university's interest. Id.
The regulation must be reasonable but not necessarily perfect. Id.
204. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 429.
205. Id. at 436.
206. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
207. Id. at 478.
208. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1994). This statute prohibited alcohol content from
appearing on labels or in advertisements of beer. Id.
209. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 479.
210. Id.
211. Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991).
212. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 479.
213. Adolph Coors Co. v. Bensten, 2 F3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993).
214. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 512 U.S. 1203 (1994).
215. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 483.
216. Id. at 483. The Court did not focus on the first step because "both the lower
courts and parties agree that respondents seek to disclose only truthful, verifiable, and
nonmisleading factual information about alcohol content on its beer labels." Id.
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that the governmental interests behind the regulations were: (1) to
2 17
prevent "strength wars"; and (2) to help states regulate alcohol.
The majority determined that these interests were not substantial
enough to meet the Central Hudson test.218 The Court then found
that the regulations did not decrease the "strength wars" and
therefore did not advance the governmental interest. 2 9 Based on
the application of the Central Hudson test, the majority held that
220
the regulations were unconstitutional.
The final case in the series of cases that applied the Central
Hudson test is 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.221 In 1956,
Rhode Island passed legislation that disallowed putting the price of
alcoholic beverages in advertisements. 222 Peoples Super Liquor
Stores, Inc. ("Peoples") and 44 Liquormart, Inc. ("Liquormart") both
published advertisements that did not give the price of the
alcoholic beverages themselves but advertised other goods at
bargain prices next to the alcoholic beverages in the
advertisements. 22 The Rhode Island Liquor Control Administration
fined Liquormart and Peoples $400 because the advertisements
224
made an implied inference that they sold cheap alcohol.
Liquormart and Peoples sought declaratory judgment in the district
217. Id. at 485.
218. Id. at 486.
219. Id.
220. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491. The Court found that the government's interest in
preventing "strength wars" was not directly and materially advanced by the statutes and
there were less extensive ways to achieve this goal. Id.
221. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
222. R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-8-7 (1987). This regulation provides in pertinent part:
Advertising price of malt beverages, cordials, wine, or distilled liquor. - No
manufacturer, wholesaler, or shipper from without this state and no holder of a
license issued under the provisions of this title and chapter shall cause or permit the
advertising in any manner whatsoever of the price of any malt beverage, cordials,
wine or distilled liquor offered for sale in this state; provided, however, that the
provisions of this section shall not apply to price signs or price tags attached to or
placed on merchandise for sale within the licensed premises in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the department.
Id. R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-8-8.1 (1987), provides in pertinent part:
Price advertising by media or advertising companies unlawful. - No newspapers,
periodicals, radio or television broadcaster or broadcasting company or any other
person, firm, or corporation with a principal place of business in the state of Rhode
Island which is engaged in the business of advertising or selling advertising time or
space shall accept, publish, or broadcast any advertisement in this state of the price
or make reference to the price of any alcoholic beverages. Any person who shall
violate any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
223. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 492-93.
224. Id. at 493.
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court that the Rhode Island regulations violated the First
Amendment. 5 The district court found that the pricing ban did
violate the First Amendment.226 The court of appeals disagreed and
reversed the decision of the district court. 27 The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari due to the importance of the
issue.228 The Court first gave a brief history of the regulation of
commercial speech. 9 The majority reviewed the Central Hudson
test but concluded that a stricter test is required when a state
completely bans the communication "of truthful, nomnisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a
fair bargaining process."2 0 The Court found that the Rhode Island
regulations in question constituted a total ban on "truthful,
nonmisleading speech about a lawful product" and the "ban serves
an end unrelated to consumer protection." 231 The majority primarily
examined whether the Rhode Island regulations would materially
advance the interest of the government in reducing alcohol
consumption.2 2 The Court concluded that Rhode Island did not
show that the regulations materially advanced its interest;
therefore, the Court held that the regulations violated the First
Amendment.2
Since Valentine, there have been drastic alterations in the way
the Court has examined the First Amendment's protection of
commercial speech. In Valentine, the majority concluded that the
First Amendment did not protect commercial speech. 231 Following
Valentine, the Court steadily moved toward affording First
Amendment protection to commercial speech and developed the
Central Hudson test to determine when this protection was
violated by a regulation or restriction on commercial speech. 23 5 The
majority applied the Central Hudson test in Lorillard in order to
determine if the Massachusetts regulations violated the First
Amendment rights of the tobacco producers and advertisers. The
225. Id.
226. Id. at 494.
227. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F3d 5 (lst Cir. 1994).
228. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 514 U.S. 1095 (1995).
229. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 498-500.
230. Id. at 501.
231. Id. at 504.
232. Id. at 505. The Court stated that the burden on Rhode Island to show that the
regulation materially advances their interest is particularly great because Rhode Island must
demonstrate that the regulations "will significantly reduce alcohol consumption." Id.
233. Id. at 516.
234. 316 U.S. at 55.
235. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

2002

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly

application of the Central Hudson test is consistent with past
decisions of the Supreme Court regarding commercial speech, and
it appears that the Central Hudson test is the standard to be
applied in future cases where the protection of commercial speech
is concerned.
Unless the Supreme Court overruled Central Hudson, it' was
impossible for the majority to reach a different conclusion. The
Court demonstrated a respect for stare decisis by applying a
precedent instead of seeking a different test in order to uphold a
regulation. The Court took a very unpopular route by declaring the
Massachusetts regulations to be unconstitutional. The majority
could have easily overruled Central Hudson in order to allow
Massachusetts to regulate tobacco advertising, since Massachusetts'
goal was to prevent tobacco advertising to children, which goal the
public supports. Instead, the Court followed a developed test and
gave stability to the law instead of overruling precedent.
The Court's decision in Lorillard has set a standard for future
cases that is based on justice and freedom. Everyone is protected
by the First Amendment and is entitled to freedom of speech.
Commercial speech is no different. If the majority had held that
states could regulate tobacco advertising to the degree that
Massachusetts wanted to, the government would have complete
control over commercial advertising of tobacco, which is
completely contrary to what the First Amendment stands for. The
Court's holding gives a clear message to the states that they can
only go so far in restricting commercial speech, even if the speech
regards something that is considered to be harmful but not illegal.
As Justice Thomas stated in his concurring opinion, "there are
many products that are harmful, such as alcohol and fast food, but
speech regarding these items is not restricted."2 6
The majority's holding in Lorillard can be viewed from two
points of view that are completely at odds with one another. On
the one side there is the position that tobacco is so harmful,
especially for children, that the Supreme Court should create a new
test for commercial speech about such a harmful product. On the
other side there is the position that tobacco, though harmful, is
legal and should be afforded the same protection as other
commercial speech, and so the Central Hudson test should be
applied. The first viewpoint, by only giving protection to certain
types of commercial speech and refusing protection to others,
236.

Lori/ard, 121 S. Ct. at 243840 (Thomas, J.,concurring).
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would eventually turn the First Amendment into a selective right
with the government and the courts determining who was worthy
of such a right. The second viewpoint, by viewing all forms of
commercial speech regarding legal activity equally, allows the First
Amendment to continue to do what it was designed to do, that is,
to protect all people from governmental determination of what can
be expressed.
Angela M. Sheffler

